The rapid growth of data has raised the importance of privacy-preserving techniques in distributed machine learning. In this paper, we develop a privacy-preserving method to a class of regularized empirical risk minimization (ERM) machine learning problems. We first decentralize the learning algorithm using the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM), and propose the method of dual variable perturbation to provide dynamic differential privacy. The mechanism leads to a privacy-preserving algorithm under mild conditions of the convexity and differentiability of the loss function and the regularizer. We study the performance of the algorithm measured by the number of data points required to achieve a bounded error. To design an optimal privacy mechanism, we analyze the fundamental tradeoff between privacy and accuracy, and provide guidelines to choose privacy parameters. Numerical experiments using the realworld database are performed to corroborate the results on the privacy and utility tradeoffs and design.
Introduction
Recent years have witnessed that Distributed machine learning is a promising way to manage the deluge of data. The size of the training data ranges from 1T B to 1P B [13] ; as a result, a centralized machine learning that collects and processes the data can lead to significant computational complexity and communications overhead. Therefore, a decentralized approach to machine learning is essential to reduce the computational cost, provide the scalability of the data processing and improve the quality of decision-making.
Alternating direction method of multiplier (ADMM) is one suitable approach to decentralizing a centralized machine learning problem. ADMM enables distributed training over Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. a network of collaborative nodes which exchange their parameters and outcomes with the neighbors. However, serious privacy concerns arise from the communications between two neighboring nodes, which process sensitive data including social network data, the web search histories, financial information, and medical records. It is possible for an adversary to acquire confidential information about the training data of individual nodes by observing the outcome of the learning. The adversary can be either a member of the learning network or an outsider. Differential privacy is a well-suitable concept that provides a strong privacy guarantee that the absence of a single database item does not allow an adversary to distinguish (substantially) an individual data point [8] .
This paper focuses on a class of distributed ADMM-based empirical risk minimization (ERM) problems, and develops a randomized algorithm that can provide differential privacy [8, 17] while keeping the learning procedure accurate. The privacy concepts of [8, 17] is extended to distributed machine learning over networks based on ADMM, and we propose a privacy-preserving scheme of the regularized ERMbased optimization. The method is dual variable perturbation (DVP), in which we perturb the dual variable of each node at every ADMM iteration.
We investigate the performance of the algorithms and show that the DVP is useful for non-separable learning problems. We characterize the fundamental tradeoffs between privacy and accuracy by formulating an optimization problem and use numerical experiments to demonstrate the optimal design of privacy mechanisms. We use ADMM to decentralize regularized ERM algorithms to achieve distributed training of large datasets. Dynamic differential privacy is guaranteed for the distributed algorithm using the DVP, which adds noise to the update of the dual variable. We provide the theoretical performance guarantees of the DVP version of the distributed ERM with l2 regularization. The performance is measured by the number of sample data points required to achieve certain criteria. We also propose a design principle to select the optimal privacy parameters by solving an optimization problem.
Related Work
A significant amount of research has investigated the distributed classification learning algorithm. These works have focused on either enhancing the efficiency of the learning model or on producing a global classifier from multiple distributed local classifier trained at individual nodes. Efforts have been on making the distributed algorithm suitable for large-scale datasets, e.g., MapReduce has been used to explore the performance improvements [7] . In addition, methods such as voting classification [5] , mixing parameters [14] , and ADMM methods [10] , have been used to achieve distributed computation. ADMM is used in our approach to distributed machine learning, in which the centralized problem acts as a group of distributed convex optimization subproblems connected by the consensus constraints on the decision parameters over a network.
In privacy-preserving data mining research, a large amount of literature on data perturbation for privacy (e.g., [9] , [12] ) has focused on additive or multiplicative perturbations of individual samples, which might affect certain relationships among different samples in the database. Many works also have studied the differential-private machine learning. For example, Kasiviswanathan et al. have derived a general method for probably approximately correct (PAC, [19] ) in [11] . A body of existing literature has investigated the tradeoff privacy and accuracy while researching on the theory of differential privacy (examples include [8, 15, 2] ). This work extends the notion of differential privacy to a dynamic setting, and defines dynamic differential privacy to capture the distributed and iterative nature of the ADMM-based distributed ERM.
Organization of the Paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the ADMM approach to decentralizing a centralized ERM problem, and describe the privacy concerns associated with the distributed machine learning. Section 3 presents the DVP algorithm to provide dynamic differential privacy. Section 4 studies the performance of the DVP algorithm and Section 5 shows numerical experiments to corroborate the results and optimal design principles to the tradeoff between privacy and accuracy. Finally, Section 6 presents concluding remarks and future research directions.
Problem Statement
Consider a connected network, which contains P nodes described by an undirected graph G(P, E) with the set of nodes P = {1, 2, 3, ..., P }, and a set of edges E denoting the links between connected nodes. A particular node p ∈ P only exchanges information between its neighboring node j ∈ Np, where j ∈ Np is the set of all neighboring nodes of node p, and Np = |Np| is the number of neighboring nodes of node p. Each node p contains a dataset Dp = {(xip, yip) ⊂ X × Y : i = 0, 1, ..., Bp}, which is of size Bp with data vector xip ∈ X ⊆ R d , and the corresponding label yip ∈ Y := {−1, 1}. The entire network therefore has a set of dataD = p∈P Dp.
The target of the centralized classification algorithm is to find a classifier f : X → Y using all available dataD that enables the entire network to classify any data x input to a label y ∈ {−1, 1}. Let ZC 1 (f |D) be the objective function of a regularized empirical risk minimization problem (CR-ERM), defined as follows:
where C
R
Bp is a regularization parameter, and ρ > 0 is the parameter that controls the impact of the regularizer.
Suppose thatD is available to the fusion center node, then we can choose the global classifier f : X → Y that minimizes the CR-ERM.
The loss functionL(yip,
, is used to measure the quality of the classifier trained. In this paper, we focus on the specific loss functionL(yip, (1) is a regularizer that prevents overfitting. In this paper, we have the following assumptions on the loss, regularization functions, and the data. 
Distributed ERM
To decentralize CR-ERM, we introduce decision variables {fp} P p=1 , where node p determines its own classifier fp, and impose consensus constraints f1 = f2 = ... = fP that guarantee global consistency of the classifiers. Let {wjp} be the auxiliary variables to decouple fp of node p from its neighbors j ∈ Np. Then, the consensus-based reformulation of (1) becomes
s.t. fp = wpj, wpj = fj, p = 1, ..., P, j ∈ Np
where ZC 2 ({fp}p∈P |D) is the reformulated objective as a function of {fp} presents a feasible solution of (2) and the network is connected, then problems (1) and (2) are equivalent, i.e., f = fp, p = 1, ..., P , where f is a feasible solution of CR-ERM. Problem (2) can be solved in a distributed fashion using the alternative direction method of multiplier (ADMM) with each node p ∈ P optimizing the following distributed regularized empirical risk minimization problem (DR-ERM):
The augmented Lagrange function associated with the DR-ERM is:
(4) The distributed iterations solving (3) are:
Algorithm 1 Distributed ERM
Required: Randomly initialize fp, λp = 0 d×1 for every p ∈ P Input:D for t = 0, 1, 2, 3, ... do for p = 0 to P do Compute fp(t + 1) via (10) . end for for p = 0 to P do Broadcast fp(t + 1) to all neighbors j ∈ Np. end for for p = 0 to P do Compute λp(t + 1) via (11) . end for end for Output: f * .
According to Lemma 2 in [10] , iterations (5) to (8) can be further simplified by initializing the dual variables λ k pj = 0 d×d , and letting λp(t) = j∈Np λ k pj , p ∈ P, j ∈ Np, k = a, b, we can combine (7) and (8) 
The ADMM iterations (5)-(8) can be reduced to
The ADMM-based distributed ERM iterations (10)-(11) are summarized in Algorithm 1. Every node p ∈ P updates its local d × 1 estimates fp(t) and λp(t). At iteration t + 1, node p updates the local fp(t + 1) through (10) . Next, node p broadcasts the latest fp(t + 1) to all its neighboring nodes j ∈ Np. Iteration t + 1 finishes as each node updates the λp(t + 1) via (11) .
Every iteration of our algorithm is still a minimization problem similar to the centralized problem (1) . However, the number of variables participating in solving (10) per node per iteration is Np, which is much smaller than the one in the centralized problem, which is P p=1 Np. There are several methods to solve (10) . For instance, projected gradient method, Newton method, and Broyden-FletcherGoldfarb-Shanno (BFGS) method [6] that approximates the Newton method, to name a few.
ADMM-based distributed machine learning has benefits due to its high scalability. It also provides a certain level of privacy since nodes do not communicate data directly but their decision variable fp. However, the privacy arises when an adversary can make intelligent inferences at each step and extract the sensitive information based on his observation of the learning output of his neighboring nodes. Simple anonymization is not sufficient to address this issue as discussed in Section 1. In the following subsection, we will discuss the adversary models, and present differential privacy solutions.
Privacy Concerns
Although the data stored at each node is not exchanged during the entire ADMM algorithm, the potential privacy risk still exists. Suppose that the dataset Dp stored at node p contains sensitive information in data point (xi, yi) that is not allowed to be released to other nodes in the network or anyone else outside. Let K : R d → R be the randomized version of Algorithm 1, and let {f * p }p∈P be the output of K at all the nodes. Then, the output {f * p }p∈P is random. In the distributed version of the algorithm, each node optimizes its local empirical risk based on its own dataset Dp. Let K t p be the node-p-dependent stochastic sub-algorithm of K at iteration t, and let fp(t) be the output of K t p (Dp) at iteration t inputting Dp. Hence, the output fp(t) is stochastic at each t. In this work, we consider the following attack model. The adversary can access the learning outputs of intermediate ADMM iterations as well as the final output. This type of adversary aims to obtain sensitive information about the private data point of the training dataset by observing the output fp(t) of K t p or f * p of K for all p ∈ P at every stage t of the training. We protect the privacy of distributed network using the definition of differential privacy in [8] . Specifically, we require that a change of any single data point in the dataset might only change the distribution of the output of the algorithm slightly, which is visible to the adversary; this is done by adding randomness to the output of the algorithm. Let Dp and D p be two datasets differing in one data point; i.e., let (xip, yip) ⊂ Dp, and (x ip , y ip ) ⊂ D p , then (xip, yip) = (x ip , y ip ). In other words, their Hamming Distance, which is defined as
To protect the privacy against the adversary, we propose the concept of dynamic differential privacy, which enables the dynamic algorithm to be privacy-preserving at every stage of the learning.
Definition 1. (Dynamic α(t)-Differential Privacy (DDP))
Consider a network of P nodes P = {1, 2, ..., P }, and each node p has a training dataset Dp, andD = p∈P Dp. Let K : R d → R be a randomized version of Algorithm 1. Let α(t) = (α1(t), α2(t), ..., αP (t)) ∈ R P + , where αp(t) ∈ R+ is the privacy parameter of node p at iteration t. Let K t p be the node-p-dependent sub-algorithm of K, which corresponds to an ADMM iteration at t that outputs fp(t). Let D p be any dataset with H d (D p , Dp) = 1, and gp(t) = K t p (D p ). We say that the algorithm K is dynamic αp(t)-differential private (DDP) if for any dataset D p , and for all p ∈ P that can be observed by an adversary, and for all possible sets of the outcomes S ⊆ R, the following inequality holds:
for all t ∈ Z during a learning process. The probability is taken with respect to fp(t), the output of K Definition 1 provides a suitable differential privacy concept for the adversary. For dynamic αp(t)-differential private algorithms, the adversaries cannot extract additional information by observing the intermediate updates of fp(t) at each step. Clearly, the algorithm with ADMM iterations shown in (10) to (11) is not dynamic αp(t)-differential private. This is because the intermediate and final optimal output fp's are deterministic given dataset Dp. For D p with H d (Dp, D p ) = 1, the classifier will change completely, and the probability density Pr([fp|D p ]) = 0, which leads to the ratio of probabilities
→ ∞. Please note that the optimization at each iteration in ADMM is independent of each other different iteration. This property of ADMM makes it possible that the privacy at each node each iteration is independent; the level of privacy at node p ∈ P iteration t totally depends on the value of αp(t) chosen at time t and is independent of αj(t ), for all t = t and all j = p. Thus, our dynamic privacy is also independent of the number of iterations. As a result, the adversaries cannot obtain additional information from each iteration and there is nothing in previous iterations they can take advantage of to extract more information in later iterations.
Dynamic Private Preserving
In this subsection, we describe the algorithm that provides dynamic α-differential privacy defined in Section 2.2. We extend the definition of differential privacy in [8] , in which the output, i.e., the variable in our case, is perturbed by random noise before releasing it. The fact that the optimization at each iteration in ADMM is independent of each other at different iterations has made it possible to deal with the privacy issue at a node p ∈ P in each iteration individually. However, the directly perturbed variables will be transmitted to neighboring nodes and thus the noise terms from all the neighboring nodes as well as the node p itself will be directly involved in the optimization at the next iteration. Thus, we perturb the Lagrange multiplier, i.e., dual variable, instead. The perturbed dual variable randomizes optimization at each iteration, and thus the output of each iteration. We name this method as the dual variable perturbation (DVP).
Dual Variable Perturbation
In the DVP, the dual variables {λp(t)} P p=1 are perturbed with a random noise vector p(t) ∈ R d with the probability density function Kp( ) ∼ e −ζp (t) , where ζp(t) is a parameter related to the value of αp(t), and · denotes the l2 norm. At each iteration, we first perturb the dual variable λp(t), obtained from the last iteration, and store it in a new variable µp(t) = λp(t) + p(t). Now the corresponding node-
defined as follows, and L dual p (t) is used as a short-hand notation:
where Φ 2 fp 2 is an additional penalty. As a result, the minimizer of L dual p (t) is random. At each iteration, we first perturb the dual variable λp(t), obtained from the last iteration, and store it in a new variable µp(t + 1). Now, the iterations (10)- (11) become follows:
The iterations (14)- (16) are summarized in Algorithm 2, and are illustrated in Figure 1 . All nodes have its corresponding value of ρ. Every node p ∈ P updates its local estimates µp(t), fp(t) and λp(t) at time t; at time t+1, node p first perturbs the dual variable λp(t) obtained at time t to obtain µp(t + 1) via (14) , and then uses training dataset Dp to compute fp(t + 1) via (15) . Next, node p sends fp(t + 1) to all its neighboring nodes. The (t + 1)-th update is done when each node updates its local λp(t+1) via (16) . We then have the following theorem. − ρ − 2ηNp andαp = αp(t)/2.
Algorithm 2 Dual Variable Perturbation
end if Draw noise p(t) according to Kp( ) ∼ e −ζp(t) with ζp(t) =αp. Compute µp(t + 1) via (14) and fp(t + 1) via (15) with augmented Lagrange function as (13) . end for for p = 0 to P do Broadcast fp(t + 1) to all neighbors j ∈ Np. end for for p = 0 to P do Compute λp(t + 1) via (16) . end for end for Output: {f * p } P p=1 .
Theorem 1. Under Assumption 1, 2 and 3, if the DR-ERM problem can be solved by Algorithm 2, then Algorithm 2 solving this distributed problem is dynamic α-differential private with αp(t) for each node p ∈ P at time t. Let Q(fp(t)|D) and Q(fp(t)|D p ) be the probability density functions of fp(t) given dataset D and D p , respectively, with
The ratio of conditional probabilities of fp(t) is bounded as follows:
Proof: See Appendix.
Performance Analysis
In this section, we discuss the performance of Algorithm 2. We establish performance bounds for regularization functions with l2 norm. Our analysis is based on the following assumptions:
Assumption 4. The data points {(xpi, ypi)} Bp i=1 are drawn i.i.d. from a fixed but unknown probability distribution P xy (xpi, ypi) at each node p ∈ P.
Assumption 5. p(t) is drawn from (15) with the same αp(t) = α(t) for all p ∈ P at time t ∈ Z.
We then define the expected loss of node p using classifier fp as follows, under Assumption 4:
and the corresponding expected objective functionẐ is:
The performance of non-private non-distributed ERM classification learning has been already studied by, for example, Shalev et al. in [18] (also see the work of Chaudhuri et al. in [3] ), which introduces a reference classifier f 0 with expected lossĈ(f 0 ), and shows that if the number of data points is sufficiently large, then the actual expected loss of the trained l2 regularized support vector machine (SVM) classifier fSV M satisfieŝ
where αacc is the generalization error. We use a similar argument to study the accuracy of Algorithm 1. Let f 0 be the reference classifier of Algorithm 1. We quantify the performance of our algorithms with f * as the final output by the number of data points required to obtain
However, instead of focusing on only the final output, we care about the learning performance at all iterations. Let f (t)} is a nonprivate classifier without added perturbations. Since the optimization is minimization, then there exists a constant ∆ non (t) at time t such that:Ĉ(f
and substituting it toĈ(f * ) Ĉ 0 + αacc, yields:
Clearly, the above condition depends on the reference classifier f 0 ; actually, as shown later in this section, the number of data points depends on the l2-norm f 0 of the reference classifier. Usually, the reference classifier is chosen with an upper bound on f 0 , say b 0 . Based on (18), we provide the following theorem on the performance of Algorithm 1. satisfy: Bp > βnon
Note that αacc 1 is required for most machine learning algorithms. In the case of SVM, if the constraints are yif T xi cSV M , for i = 1, , ..., n, where n is the number of data points, then, classification margin is csvm/ f . Thus, if we want to maximization the margin cSV M / f 
Performance of Private Algorithms
Similar to Algorithm 1, we solve an optimization problem minimizing L dual p (fp, t|Dp) at each iteration. Let fp(t) and λp(t) be the primal and dual variables used in minimizing L dual p (fp, t|Dp) at iteration t, respectively. Suppose that starting from iteration t, the noise vector is static with p(t) generated at iteration t. To compare our private classifier at iteration t with a private reference classifier f 0 (t), we construct a corresponding algorithm, Alg-2, associated with Algorithm 2. However, starting from iteration t + 1, . We can directly apply the loss function LLR to Theorem 1 and 2 with R(f ) = , and then it can provide αp(t)-differential privacy for all t ∈ Z.
We also study the privacy-accuracy tradeoff of Algorithm 2. The privacy is quantified by the value of αp(t). A larger αp(t) implies that the ratio of the densities of the classifier fp(t) on two different data sets is larger, which implies a higher belief of the adversary when one data point in dataset D is changed; thus, it provides lower privacy. However, the accuracy of the algorithm increases as αp(t) becomes larger. As shown in Figure 2 , a larger αp(t) leads to faster convergence of the algorithm. When αp(t) is small, the model is more private but less accurate. Therefore, the utilities of privacy and accuracy need to satisfy the following assumptions:
Assumption 6. The utilities of privacy is monotonically increasing with respect to αp(t) for every p ∈ P but accuracy is monotonically decreasing with respect to αp(t) for every p ∈ P.
The quality of classifier is measured by the total empirical loss
represent the relationship between αp(t) and C(t). The function Lacc is obtained by curve fitting given the experimental data points (αp(t), C(t)). Let Upriv(αp(t)) : R+ → R be the utility of privacy, same for every node p ∈ P. Besides the decreasing monotonicity, Upriv(αp(t)) is assumed to be convex and doubly differentiable function of αp(t). In our experiment, we model the utility of privacy as: Upriv(αp(t)) = ωp1 · ln
, where, ωpj ∈ R for j = 1, 2, 3, 4. For training the classifier, we use a few fixed values of ρ and test the empirical loss C(t) = C R Bp Bp i=1 LLR(t) of the classifier. Then, we select the value of ρ that minimizes the empirical loss for a fixed αp (0.3 in this experiment). We also test the non-private version of algorithm, and the corresponding minimum ρ is obtained as the control. We choose the corresponding optimal values of the regularization parameter ρ 
Conclusion
In this work, we have developed an ADMM-based algorithm, using dual variable perturbation (DVP) to solve a centralized regularized ERM in a distributed fashion while providing dynamic α(t)-differential privacy for the ADMM iterations as well as the final trained output. Thus, the sensitive information stored in the training dataset at each node is protected against both the internal and the external adversaries.
Based on distributed training datasets, Algorithm 2 perturbs the dual variable λp(t) for every node p ∈ P at iteration t before minimizing the augmented Lagrange function to calculate the primal variable fp(t). The performance analysis of DVP indicates that it is suitable for difficult problems that are non-separable or with small margin. In general, the accuracy decreases as privacy requirements are more stringent. The tradeoff between the privacy and accuracy is studied. Our experiments on real data from UCI Machine Learning Repository show that dual variable perturbation is able to manage the privacy-accuracy tradeoff while keeping a good convergence performance.
APPENDIX
Proof. (Theorem 1) Let fp(t + 1) be the optimal primal variable with zero duality gap. From the Assumption 1 and 2, we know that both the loss function L and the regularizer R(·) are differentiable and convex, and by using the KarushKuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality condition, we have
y ip L (y ip fp(t + 1) T x ip )x ip + ρ∇R(fp) + 2 C R 2Bp p(t) + λp(t) + (Φ + 2ηNp)fp(t + 1)
− η i∈Np (fp(t) + f i (t)), from which we can establish the relationship between the noise p(t) and the optimal primal variable fp(t + 1) as:
yipL (yipfp(t + 1) T xip)xip − Bp C R ρ∇R(fp) − 2Bp C R λp(t) − Bp C R (Φ + 2ηNp)fp(t + 1) + Bpη C R i∈Np (fp(t) + fi(t)).
(20)
